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At the turn of the millennium, the European 
Union deluded itself with a false sense of security. 
It had sought to build a ring of friends that were 
supposed to become prosperous and more demo-
cratic, and to filter migrants coming to Europe. By 
doing so, Europeans made a twin mistake: they 
believed that their neighbours would emulate 
their example, and they outsourced their migra-
tion and border policies. This, in turn, had two 
consequences. 
First, Europeans played into the hands of authori-
tarian and murderous leaders who exacted con-
cessions in return for keeping migrants at bay. In 
the 2000s, for instance, Colonel Qaddafi obtained 
financial rewards, as well as international recogni-
tion. And the agreement that the EU struck with 
Ankara on 18 March 2016 to dry up the Aegean 
and Balkan routes for smugglers and refugees de-
pends on Turkey’s willingness to comply. Second, 
Europeans ignored power politics. In designing the 
so-called ‘ring of friends’, the EU stumbled over 
what the Kremlin considered to be its sphere of 
influence. The Commission and the Council pro-
duced technical solutions, Association Agreements 
and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTA), for what actually was a political issue: 
competition over eastern Europe. 
A global strategy worthy of its name should start 
with promoting security on the European continent 
and in its surroundings. The European Union es-
tablished itself as a small community which forged 
a new way of conducting international relations in 
Europe. It gradually – and sometimes haphazardly 
and reluctantly – expanded its model and eventu-
ally began to dominate the continent and influence 
its periphery. This has now changed. The current 
challenges – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, forays 
in NATO members’ airspace, the war in Syria, in-
roads into the EU through Gazprom, corruption 
and disinformation, the refugee crisis, the spread 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
to Libya, Mali and Europe – are the result of some 
of the failings of the EU.
Predict and prepare 
First of all, the European Union, as a collec-
tive, has repeatedly proven to be unable to think 
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ahead. The latest wave of refugees started to build 
up in 2011, when uprisings in the Arab world 
were crushed. Although EU agencies and institu-
tions published figures, and NGOs offered solu-
tions (such as the resettlement of refugees to un-
dermine people trafficking and allow for vetting), 
little was done.  National administrative budgets 
– of the German Federal 
Office for Migrants and 
Refugees, for instance 
– were cut, and capaci-
ties to register migrants 
did not expand, be it 
in Greece or Italy. And, 
since the European 
Court of Human Rights 
ruled in 2011 that Athens disregarded the rights 
of refugees, the latter could not be deported back 
to Greece if they had crossed that country to move 
illegally to another EU member state. All of these 
were indicators that the so-called refugee crisis 
was in the making, and yet the EU still did not 
anticipate the massive influx of migrants. 
The crisis over Ukraine offers a similar account. 
Though the Kremlin imposed a massive embargo 
on Ukrainian goods as of the summer of 2013, and 
President Putin met four times with his Ukrainian 
counterpart in November, Europeans deluded 
themselves by firmly believing that Kiev would 
sign the DCFTA. No proposal was made to miti-
gate the consequences of the embargo – despite 
the fact that Brussels later increased the quota of 
Moldovan wine, which was also subjected to a 
Russian embargo for the same reasons. 
Think and act European 
Second, the decision-making process of the EU is 
becoming increasingly dysfunctional. The heads 
of state and government have abandoned the 
Monnet method for numerous reasons, primarily 
to protect their so-called sovereignty, and also, as 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel put it, to pro-
mote the speed and efficiency of decision-making 
by centralising decisions within the European 
Council. Whether this is successful is far from ob-
vious. When asked why the EU could not fore-
see the refugee crisis, a minister and confidante 
of Chancellor Merkel retorted that he could not 
multitask. Overwhelmed by the series of crises, 
the European Council has become overstretched, 
and the specific issues 
it does not deal with, 
such as the Normandy 
negotiations, fall onto 
the shoulders of the 
German Chancellor 
– who is even more 
overburdened herself. 
Instead of being fa-
cilitated, the decision-making process in the EU 
is blocked: European and national civil servants 
cannot take political decisions and rely upon tech-
nocratic approaches. The DCFTA with Ukraine is 
a very good example of this lack of political think-
ing.
Last, because of prevailing of national sovereign-
ties, the EU is incapable of controlling its own 
borders. Frontex was created to mount limited 
operations in order to repel illegal migrants. The 
external borders of the EU were, and still are, con-
trolled by the peripheral member states. This sys-
tem is dysfunctional, too. 
The EU and its eastern neighbours share 4,000 
miles of land borders, of which 1,400 are with 
Russia. 23 out of 28 member states have a coast-
line adding up to a little over 40,000 miles of in-
dentations, caps, bays, and islands, some of which 
are very close to the borders of Asia and Africa, 
where problems abound. Only a European border 
guard would have a chance to work properly, pa-
trolling coasts and inspecting harbours where, ac-
cording to intelligence sources, surveillance is far 
too limited. 
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‘Instead of being facilitated, the decision-
making process in the EU is blocked: 
European and national civil servants 
cannot take political decisions and rely 
upon technocratic approaches.’
